Infantry Tactics of World War II

Terrific review of what looks to be a long-overdue book for World War II buffs. Great Father's Day gift folks.

Book review: Second World War Infantry Tactics by Stephen Bull

By Pam Norfolk
Published on Monday 30 April 2012 07:00

‘Battles and wars are not won unless the infantry is standing on the land that once belonged to the enemy. They live under the hardest conditions and suffer the most danger. It is the pits, a place to stay out of...’

The combat-hardened words of US foot soldier Radford Carrol will ring true with warriors of every nation. Since time immemorial, the ‘poor bloody infantry’ has done the dirty front-line work of war.

They bear the brunt of fighting and often suffer disproportionately in comparison with the other arms of service, and yet the history of infantry tactics is too rarely studied and often misunderstood.

Curator of military history and archaeology for Lancashire Museums, Stephen Bull sets the record straight in this fascinating, in-depth account of the fighting methods of the infantry during the Second World War.

He focuses on the infantry theory and the combat experience of the three major players, the British, German and American armies, while his close analysis of the rules of engagement, the manuals, the training and equipment is balanced by vivid descriptions of the tactics as they were tested in action.

These operational examples show how infantry tactics on all sides developed as the war progressed and give a telling insight into the realities of infantry warfare.

So how did an infantryman function in combat when whole belts of ammunition and train loads of shells were meant not merely to kill him, but blow him to pieces?

The answer, says Bull, is by being taught to fight in very specific ways, not just to pull the trigger or control the desire to run. Chaotic as combat often is, the models for infantry actions are a complex choreography.

During the Second World War, infantry techniques changed over the six years between 1939 and 1945 with armies learning from each other and becoming more similar in their tactical outlook.

Whilst we tend to think of this war as a period of technological leaps – radar, atom bombs and submarines – the truth is that troops still had to advance, take ground and cities, kill and be killed.

As the British Operations manual of 1939 noted, it was infantry that confirmed success, compelled the withdrawal or surrender of the enemy, and held objectives.

But this meant the fighting foot soldiers inevitably absorbed most of the punishment. In Normandy alone, British infantry represented about 70 per cent of the army’s losses even though only one in four men was actually in the infantry.

Bull says that the outcomes of combat can never be predicted however many calculations are made because, in reality, men are not numbers and do not always act in accordance with theories.

He claims that very often individual soldiers cannot see, or perhaps do not understand, the bigger picture. Some do not know they are in range, ‘others can clearly see the gates of heaven, or a quick way home. Others are too tired or hungry to care.’

Bravery in battle, he says, is often depicted as ‘suicidal’ in histories and novels but mostly is a response to their training, battle ‘fever’ and traumas. What injuries soldiers most fear also has an impact on what they might do in combat, or are prepared to venture.

A major pitfall in the study of tactics, says Bull, is the idea that there are tactical absolutes, some perfect movements that, if only they could be discovered and applied, would always prove successful.

Every age is different, with important factors like economics and technology changing rapidly. New weapons and training can appear very quickly in times of war, weather can have a massive impact and, most importantly, people change too...

Bull’s excellent book focuses on the infantry’s role in the infamous blitzkrieg and on the growing significance of sections and squads. He emphasises the increasing importance of combat in urban areas – in buildings, sewers and rooftops – which evolved through the experience gained in bitter protracted urban battles like Stalingrad.

Accessible, well-researched and wide-ranging, Second World War Infantry Tactics is an enthralling introduction to the methods of the opposing ground forces as they confronted each other on the European battlefields of 70 years ago, and a tribute to the men who fought and died.

Pen&Sword, hardback, £19.99)

Original article

Das Reich V 1943-1945 by Otto Weidinger; A Review

Das Reich V 1943-1945, 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich by Otto Weidinger. J.J. Fedorowicz, 2012.

When one finds a new title from Fedorowicz in the mailbox, still in the original shrink wrap and therefore untouched by human hands, the discerning book lover (and military history buff, since that's their forte) instantly feels the electric thrill that comes from knowing what a fantastic experience awaits. Not simply the unique and reliable information within the text that is candy for the mind of the historian and historian wannabe, but also the immense tactile joy that comes from handling a book that is constructed from the finest materials and the finest paper. Fedorowicz titles are beyond first-rate in all respects.

Such exhilaration is doubly great when dealing with a title that is so long-coveted as Weidinger's concluding volume in the history of the original Waffen-SS division, 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich. For those who are not World War II buffs, and more specifically buffs of the German units and the Eastern Front, where Das Reich spent most of its operational life, this may seem like an odd book. After all, the Germans were the enemy, the Waffen-SS did some horrific things, and Das Reich is the division that is directly responsible for the attack on the French village of Oradour-sur-Glane. It was even Weidinger's regiment, the 4th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment Das Reich, that was responsible for Oradour. So, why even read this book, much less review it?

Well, there's two reasons. First, I'm a military historian and I look for the best possible references for my work. Weidinger is a primary source for the period I am researching, he was there and was directly involved in the action, and primary sources are never to be overlooked. The astute historian will have to try and identify and compensate for biases, yes, but facts are facts, independent of interpretation. If Weidinger says Das Reich was in a certain place at a certain time, and his statement contradicts that of a lesser source, then Weidinger's account gets the benefit of the doubt. Just as Josephus is the best account we have of the Jewish revolt in the reign of Nero, despite the fact that historians see bias in parts of his work, Weidinger's account is the best we have for the movements of Das Reich during this period.

Second, the writing of military history divorces itself as much as possible from the other streams of history, such as social history. Military history covers the movements and actions of military units. I try to flavor my accounts with local histories and insights from the civilian population, but in the end the work is about the soldiers. This book is military history of the first order, and thus is very appropriate for the work at hand.

Weidinger writes in a very clear voice and a very matter of fact style. He uses quotes from famous Waffen-SS veterans, such as Ernst Barkmann, very effectively. Indeed, one such quote completely cleared up a confused situation that I have been researching for years. With the Waffen-SS being declared a criminal organization in toto, and with Weidinger himself having been tried as a war criminal (he was acquitted), Waffen-SS veterans who were reluctant to share their experiences talked openly with Weidinger, and those accounts are priceless. Not only that, the book was fact-checked by one of the highest ranking Waffen-SS men to survive the war, Paul Hausser, which means that the actions described are almost certainly what took place. Yes, the historian has to try and filter out the author's biases, but that's true for any source, not just this one.

Weidinger was not one of the good guys, but on the Eastern Front there were no good guys. Just serving in the German or Russian Army, however, did not make you automatically a villain. Just as soldiers of the Red Army had zero choice about their fate, so were many of Das Reich's rank and file during this time drafted into the division from other services, such as the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, and had no choice except to serve where they were told to serve. Refusing would have meant a firing squad

There is one glaring error to the book, but it was not made by Weidinger. Rather, whoever wrote the back cover blurb describing the book should be sent to remedial classes; after all, when you edit for a publishing house that specializes in World War II history, you should at least know the basics. Here's the offending passage on the back cover: "...in March it participated in the three efforts to relieve Budapest." Well, good grief. Those three efforts were Operations Konrad I, Konrad II and Konrad III, and even a quick glance at Wikipedia would show they took place in January, before Das Reich had left Belgium headed for Hungary, not in March. Not only that, Budapest fell on February 12th, 1945, so by March there was nothing to relieve since the city was already in Soviet hands. The only operation in March was Unternehmen Fruelingerwachen, Operation Spring Awakening, the last German offensive of the war, and that had nothing to do with Budapest and everything to do with protecting the oil fields at Nagykanizsa.

Aside from this, however, the book is a long-awaited gem of military history from a man who lived through that history, produced in a costly volume that is more than worth its price.